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Summary
The EU and the USA are facing similar threats to their energy supply. Both of them
have published strategies to deal with that topic. While the US energy supply is still
somewhat self-reliant, the Europeans have to import most of their needs from 
abroad. Especially the Eastern European member states are almost completely
dependent on energy imports from Russia.
The author compares the energy data of both regions and offers a closer look on
future trends in energy policy. Although there is much commonness on a general
level, common action will be rare. But still a transatlantic energy partnership may be
the point of origin for a large-scale regime on sustainable energy security.
1. Energy Security: Where do we stand?
Lately, energy related news has been filling newspapers and scientific magazines.
Since Russia’s repeated saber-rattling in January 2007 European and U.S. citizens
have been alert. The EU member states have to import over 55% 1 of their energy
needs while the USA only about 30%.2 These two regions as different as they may
be are facing a similar problem: First of all, an increasing demand for energy re-
sources coincides with shrinking own deposits. In addition to that the growing con-
troversies between the producing and the consuming states will be the second major
hurdle for the Western energy supply. Europe and America as transatlantic partners
have to deal with some serious challenges of which five can be identified as the main
difficulties:
– Geographically, the enlarged EU has moved closer towards Russia. But due to the
historical heritage and the increased import dependency – especially for the
Baltic and Central European States – relations between the resource superpower
and its Western trading partners did not develop alike. While for example Poland
imports nearly all of its gas and oil from Russia, Warsaw is very suspicious about
the German-Russian Nordstream pipeline.3 An energy superpower in the east is
obviously frightening for the new EU-members. Venezuela and its neighbors
have placed the USA in a similar situation: As imports from Latin America in-
crease, so do the dependency and the vulnerability.
– The Middle East is today an even more fragile region than it was some years ago.
Iran is on its way to become a nuclear power, and Iraq is currently undergoing a
kind of ethnic war. Besides these main conflicts terrorism and piracy are endan-
gering energy infrastructures from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean Sea in
a hitherto unknown scale. As Europe and the USA will increasingly have to
import oil and gas from this region, instability, terrorism, and regional conflicts
pose a risk for energy security. Furthermore, as infrastructures have to serve ever
longer distances the liability to the aforementioned threats cumulate with every
kilometer.
– “We are addicted to oil”, President Bush said a few months ago in one of his State
of the Union addresses.4 That is even more true for the Europeans. Whereas the
USA has to import almost 60% of its yearly oil demand, the EU has already
reached a quota of over 80%.5 While consumption is growing worldwide no new
major oil fields are being discovered and older ones are about to dry out during
Baumann · Energy Security
Page 4 C·A·P Policy Analysis · 2 · 2007
C·A·P Policy Analysis · 2 · 2007 Page 5
Global climate change
Mature infrastructures
and super-grids
Dependence on Fossil Fuels
Baumann · Energy Security
the next decades. At the same time the rising economies in Asia – like China and
India – need incremental amounts of oil to fuel their vastly expanding industries.
So while reserves are decreasing, in the near future more countries will need a lot
more oil. Higher prices and struggle for the distribution of resources will be
among the key driving forces for international politics.
– Human influence on the ecosystem cannot be gainsaid any longer.The last report
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 6 once again gave a
frightening forecast on what might happen if we do not reduce the emission of
greenhouse gases: rising sea levels, weather extremes, desertification and other
damage to the environment. These events should be seen as some of the main
risks in the years to come. Spreading drought causes damage to farmlands, fish-
eries and forests. A higher average sea level not only may be a direct threat for
some exotic archipelagos but also increases the risk of spring tides and floods.
Thus people – especially in the southern hemisphere – may become short of food,
fresh water and land for farming and living. Besides all these aspects of humani-
ty the climate change is nowadays seen as a serious aspect of security. As a side
effect global warming possibly will bring tropical diseases such as malaria and
yellow fever to previously uninfected regions in Europe and North America. If the
IPCC-scenario becomes reality natural disasters, conflicts about water, food and
land as well as uncontrollable migration may add pressure on Western security
policy.
– Last November a German energy supplier caused a Europe-wide blackout
through a planned shutdown of only a small part of its grid. More than 10 mil-
lion people – from Hamburg to Malaga had no electricity for hours.7 But North
America had some huge outages as well: In 2003 a fallen tree and a switched off
computer initialized a mega-blackout which cut off large parts of the west coast
and Canada from electricity.8 Electricity is the primary source of energy in the
industrialized world but the European and U.S. grids are old and were not built
for today’s needs. External influence, overstraining during peak times of demand,
or simple accidents can cause parts of the grid and plants to go offline. So the
remaining capacity has to deal with even higher loads, which quite likely might
lead to giga-blackouts as it already happened more than once in the past.
2. Data on European and U.S. energy supply
Talking about energy security requires a minimum of understanding of the basic data
presented in the following paragraphs. Both regions are not self-sufficient when it
comes to energy, as already mentioned before. But while the EU nowadays needs to
rely on foreign sources of energy for about two thirds of its demand, the United
States  is in a better condition with an import ratio of about one third. Nonetheless,
the USA imports approximately 13 million barrels per day – which represents more
than 60% of the total demand – mostly from Latin America, the Middle East and
Canada. U.S. oil consumption totals up to 7.5 billion barrels each year, making the
country by far the biggest single consumer. Within the EU only Denmark, Italy and
the United Kingdom (UK) have relevant oil-reserves – together only 5 billion barrels
or 0.5 percent whereas North America accounts for a tenfold of the amount of over-
all proven reserves. Member states consumed 5.4 billion barrels in 2005, which
means 18% of global demand, compared to 30% in North America. Concerning
external resources Europe imports nearly as much oil as the United States but most
of it is from Russia and Norway.9
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As for natural gas, global demand still shows an upward trend. With a 2.3% increase
in 2005, consumption in the EU-25 grew at a rate of 2.0%.10 Gas demand in the USA
went down by -1.5% after the consumption increased from 1990 onwards due to
higher prices and the loss of production after the hurricanes Katrina and Rita.11
Because of its high energy density and lower emissions – compared to oil and coal –
natural gas will be the fuel of choice for the next decades, especially for generating
electricity and heat. As a result of missing infrastructures and technical hurdles gas
will play only a minor role in transportation. The main reason why gas – as well as
oil – cannot be the fuel for our long-term energy future is its finiteness. Even though
experts do not agree on the point in time of the end of fossil fuels, however, for both
oil and gas the peak production is expected before 2050. The growing global energy
demand under Asian leadership12 and finite resources will lead inescapably to sup-
ply shortages and will thus effect economic development as well as every-day life.
Coal, the third of fossil fuels, has the longest history and at the same time according
to its known reserves the longest future ahead. Even though the Europeans have
some 190.000 Megatons (Mt) 13 of own resources – notably in Poland (hard coal) and
Germany (brown coal) – they imported most of the coal they burned; a trend, which
is also boosted by high prices of domestic production, even in the new member sta-
tes. In its Green Paper "Towards a European strategy for the security of energy sup-
ply"14, the Union predicted an import ratio for hard coal of 70 % and more from 2020
on. The situation in the USA is rather different; here the world’s largest coal depo-
sits are located. In the end, in 2004 America’s coal production achieved a surplus of
more than 43 Mt 15, whereas gross domestic demand afterwards slightly increased.
With a global growth rate of 5% coal was the fastest growing fuel in 2005. Especially
China fired its fast expanding economy with coal and accounted for 80% of the
increase.16
The actual debate on the finiteness of fossil fuels and global warming forced a new
interest in alternative sources of energy, such as nuclear power and renewable ener-
gy. Temporarily atomic energy accounts for 8% respectively 14% of total energy pro-
duction.17 The apparent advantages of nuclear power plants are first of all their low
CO2-emissions and secondly, the secure availability of uranium from Canada,
Australia and Kazakhstan, being three of the main suppliers. Finally, compared to
other sources of energy, atomic power is cheap. Electricity can be produced at prices
under 45 Euro per megawatt hour, while petroleum based generation costs at least
70 Euro.18 Contrary to the relative climate neutrality and the low costs, the risks of
nuclear power still exceed the benefits. Additionally, uranium resources might be
depleted during the next 150 years19 so in the long run nuclear power is not a
permanent solution for the energy challenge. The current discussion about this topic
has led to a soaring geo-strategic and ecological dynamic. Proponents of nuclear
power see it as a possibility to reduce import dependency on the Middle East and
Russia. Especially the eight Eastern European EU-members emphasize the opportu-
nity of getting rid of Russian dominance. Bulgaria, Latvia, Poland, and the Czech
Republic are about to update existing plants or build even new ones. While Belgium,
Germany and Spain enacted a phase-out policy, currently 152 reactors in 15 mem-
ber states are in operation.20 In sum, the nuclear future in Europe is blurry and will
be the reason for some basic debates.
The last group of energy sources to be discussed here are the renewables, which
today still play a minor role with shares of 6% in the USA and the EU energy mix.
Due to a higher sensitivity about energy dependence and climate change, biomass,
New thinking on energy
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solar, wind, and hydro energy have lost some of their ideological spin. Throughout
the three sectors of energy consumption – households, traffic and industry – the
renewables have had the largest growth among the sources of generating electricity
with hydro power accounting for one tenth of total EU-production.21 But there is
also a high potential for cooling and heating buildings – private as well as industrial
– in form of solar or geothermic energy. Absurdly, the renewables are still under-
developed as biofuels for cars and trucks. Lately the European Council proposed
binding margins of a 20% share of renewables in total energy production and 10%
biofuels of all traffic related fuel consumption until 2020.22 Similar to the EU, hydro
power is the largest form of renewable energy used in the USA producing 6% of
domestic gross electricity demand.23 In absolute numbers the U.S. hydro electricity
production is valued at the amount of 60.6 million tons of oil equivalent compared
to 70.8 million tons of oil equivalent in the EU.24 Apart from electricity the Americans
gained interest in using alternative fuels – “freedom fuel” 25 – for transportation. In
the 2007 State of the Union Address, President George W. Bush announced the
ambitious target of reaching a 20 percent share of biofuels until 2017.26
3. Energy security today
For a long time the energy supply was seen as a market like any other. Only the for-
mation of the OPEC – the Organization of Oil Producing Countries – gave a first hint
that energy is also about politics. Even after the world had undergone the second oil
crisis, nothing much changed. As Joseph Nye already in 1981 put it: We “... listened
too much to economists who told us that international energy policy would take care
of itself. It didn’t. So today – nearly a decade after the first warning signals – we still
need a coherent policy for energy security.“ 27 This is still true for the United States,
and even more so for Europe. But lately the topic seems to be given a new focus.28
Means of security and ecological aspects of energy are prominent right now and will
determine our future substantially. Today, a strong tension between economics,
sustainability, and environmental issues on the one hand and geopolitics on the
other hand is more obvious than ever before.
Most of the oil and gas resources are located in regions with a high level of instabi-
lity. About 26 percent of the world’s conventional gas reserves are on Russian terri-
tory and two thirds of the conventional oil reserves lie in the Middle East.29 As their
own production is declining due to dwindling domestic resources, the dependency
of Western states on foreign exports is growing. In turn, the risk that oil and gas are
used as political leverage today is higher than before. Already in 1957 Abdullah
Tariki – then head of Saudi Arabia’s Directorate of Oil and Mining Affairs – stated
that oil was „the strongest of weapons that the Arabs wield.“ 30 Additionally, most
of the producing countries show great efforts to re-nationalize their energy sectors,
e.g. Russia and Venezuela. Hence oil and natural gas deals are subject to internation-
al politics as well as economics. In January 2006 and again in 2007, Moscow and its
neighbors fought about oil and gas prices. Russia demonstrated its power by cutting
off Ukraine and later Belarus from the supply. Only six states – Iran, Iraq, Kuwait,
Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela – own close to two thirds of the proven oil re-
serves. About natural gas, global distribution is even denser, with about 60% of the
reserves being located in Russia, Iran, and Qatar.31
After the Cold War ended the relation between what formerly shaped the Western
bloc and the oil (and gas) producing countries in the Islamic world deteriorated. The
two controversial wars in Iraq and Afghanistan alienated even loyal partners on the
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Arabian Peninsula. Whereas most of the countries in Latin America always have seen
themselves as a counterweight to U.S. dominance now more and more Middle
Eastern nations want to rid themselves of Western influence. Russia, the old Cold
War foe, is on the way to become an (energy) superpower again and is not willing to
suffer external supremacy in its neighborhood. With the Middle East and Central
Asia or respectively Russia two of the three leading energy-producing regions are on
a confrontation course with the USA and to a lower extent also with the EU. If these
relations become worse, supply security will deteriorate accordingly.
Even though today’s deposits will fuel the world for quite some time, none of the
fossil fuels is endless. Additionally, due to low oil prices during the 1990s, investment
in spare capacities were omitted. The High Representative for the EU Common
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Javier Solana, touched a sore spot when he said:
"The days of easy energy are over …" 32 Geologists and oil/gas experts still differ
when peak production will be reached, but some point in the next two decades be-
comes obvious.33 Kenneth Deffeyes, a Princeton emeritus, calculated the point of
peak oil for 2005. Due to the mean database on natural gas production34 he could
not name a precise date, but claimed a near end as well: “We’re now being served
leftovers.” 35 Others are somewhat more optimistic and propose the peak oil around
2018 and the depletion mid-point for natural gas within a generation afterwards.36
All these calculations are based on static use; if the energy demand rises, both peaks
might be reached earlier. After the conventional deposits are depleted, non-conven-
tional reserves, such as Canadian oil tars or methane hydrate can elongate the age
of fossil fuels for some time, but anyhow, the epoch of oil and gas will soon be over.
Besides the scarcity of hydrocarbons another aspect of supply security is the growing
global energy demand. Especially the emerging markets in China and India can
tighten rivalry on access to diminishing resources. Over the last 10 years, the econo-
my of the People’s Republic had an annual growth average of 9%, while energy de-
mand increased about 70% over the same period and by 2030 China will import as
much oil as the USA.37 Overall the non-OECD-world will have a predicted increase
of 3%, whereas the OECD-countries’ demand will grow at a rate of 1%.38 With a tri-
pled demand in the Asian region and two additional big competitors on the market,
energy prices will rise and shortages are more likely which could fuel intense conflicts
about the access to raw materials. Furthermore, oil and natural gas are supposed to be
two of the principal determinants of geopolitics. Since natural gas was discovered as a
supplementary source of energy after the Second Oil Shock, the Europeans and the
United States had had some severe problems with Russia, or respectively the Soviet
Union. While Western Europe increased Russian gas imports during the 1980s,
Washington complained about equipping the Kremlin with money and diplomatic
leverage.39 The international inability to deal with a resource-rich Iran might bring the
energy topic on the agenda again. On the other hand, the fact that more and more
countries are relying on the Middle East to supply energy may be the key factor that
could determine the stability of that region. Naturally, the importers have an interest
in stability and do not want to risk an interruption of their supply chain.40
Another effect of growing import rates is the risky liability to terrorism, piracy and
energy infrastructure accidents.The greater the length of oil or gas pipelines, the more
points for failure are offered. On August, 19 1996, with temperatures above 40° C
a high voltage line in Oregon dilated and touched some trees. The resulting bypass
caused a blackout, which stretched out from northern USA down to Mexico. A few
million people where cut off from electricity.41 Because of connected grids in both
Transportation risks
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Europe and North America and there being only few huge generating facilities a
local interruption can spread continentally: every intrusion in one part of the power
system can lead to an overstressing somewhere else and the effect may be a total
collapse of supply. In the case of oil and gas the main aspect is not interconnection
but distance and geography. In Saudi Arabia a terrorist attack on the country’s larg-
est oil refinery on 24. February, 2006 only failed by accident. The strike would have
affected two thirds of Saudi Arabian daily oil production.42 Furthermore, ever day 17
million barrels of crude oil, which means one fifth of the global total, are passing the
Iranian Street of Hormuz – heading mainly to Europe, the USA and Japan – and there-
fore an interruption at this neuralgic point is not hard to imagine43 As most of the
energy relevant riches are to be found in the Middle East, which is not characterized
by stability, there exists a permanent threat to the supply.
Finally, man-made climate change affects energy security in two dimensions. First of
all, weather extremes can directly bring down production. Hurricane Katrina, which
hit the coast of Louisiana, reduced U.S. domestic oil and gas extraction by 860,636
barrels and 3.8 billion Gm3 respectively.44 Since the IPCC predicted a cumulation of
events such as tsunamis and hurricanes, global off-shore and coastal depletion will
be cut back more frequently. Even more frightening are the possible indirect conse-
quences: Global warming will hit the disadvantaged southern hemisphere the hard-
est: water and food shortages, land erosion as well as flooding. So in these already
less developed countries destabilization, conflicts, terrorism and migration could
escalate. Thus, exploration and transportation of resources urgently needed by the
Western nations are coming under pressure even more than before. Not to forget
that many of the states with the largest amount of raw materials belong to the poor-
est. What is sometimes called the resource curse pictures the imbalance between the
wealth earned by resource exports and social and economic underdevelopment. But
instead of giving them support in a catch-up progress the industrialized world let
them pay their bill for pollution and depletion.
4. Energy Future
Our energy future is looming dark on the horizon but rapid reaction can prevent the
transatlantic partners from a durable energy crisis. Several arrangements could
cease some of the risks while others will not disappear. Immediate action could be
as following:
– Developing a long-term strategic plan on energy security as the nationalization
of energy sectors in most of the producing countries needs a political answer.
– None of the net consuming countries will be self-reliant on the long run.
Therefore closer cooperation between them is needed.
– Diversification of fuels, routes, and origin will foster energy security.
– Decentralization of energy production – especially electricity generation – could
have been summed up under diversification as well. But due to their importance
new forms of regional or communal power plants should be a topic on its own.
– Finally, a great technology leap forward has to be achieved. Saving energy, in-
creased efficiency and new fuels or techniques of generating power can make a
substantial contribution to supply security.
To start with the strategic plan either the EU or in a best-case scenario both of them
– the EU and the USA – would have to formulate enduring objectives and think up
a strategy to achieve them. Being a nation-state is an advantage for the USA while
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the EU member states in the first instance have to find an agreement on a common
energy policy. National solos such as the German-Russian Nordstream gas pipeline
from Wyborg to Greifswald may secure Germany’s supply but it is also another step
towards dependency. Moreover, those who do not profit from that bilateral arrange-
ment – like Poland and the Czech Republic – are not amused to be excluded. Each
resilient strategy in this field must be based on the golden triangle of energy supply:
security – sustainability – affordable prices. As neither the USA nor the EU are prod-
ucing enough energy resources – even the UK started importing gas in 200445 – thus
some form of cooperation is inevitable. So because of the fact that all Europeans are
facing a very similar import addiction they should consider common action. At this
point no detailed steps should be formulated but a grand strategy has to be sketched
out answering the crucial questions of a reliable und efficient energy supply.
Diversification is one of the high-ranking tasks that has to be included in any ener-
gy strategy. The meaning of this technical term is threefold: in the geographical
dimension diversification calls for exporting from as many different countries and
routes as possible. Multiple origins of resources lower the risks of dependency. For
the USA, which imports over 80% of its natural gas demand, while the EU as a whole
imports mainly from Russia, Norway and Algeria dependency seems not to be a
problem. But a closer look on the Union reveals that the three Baltic states have to
rely completely on Russian gas exports.46 As Moscow obviously is willing to use oil
and gas as a weapon if needed, Eastern EU members should try to open up new
transport routes and push for the finality of the European internal gas market. The
more different sources of resources are available the lower are the possibilities to use
supply as political leverage. The third dimension of diversification asks for broad-
ening the energy mix in terms of its composition. Malta completely relies on oil and
Poland’s primary energy needs are obtained almost to three fifths from coal.47 So
every interruption may result in economic deadlock as well as it harms every-day life.
Especially alternative sources of energy such as solar and wind power or homegrown
biofuels can bring partial autarky and reduce dangerous dependency.
In the United States Micro-Breweries are very famous for their locally brewed beer
that is adjusted to the gusto of a small circle of customers. This concept could be ap-
plied to power generation as in that realm right now only some mega plants produ-
ce electricity, which is even sold abroad. Distributed energy generation would lower
interferences due to long distance transportation. Communities and even house-
holds could produce parts of their electricity and heating demand independently. If
renewables are used the addiction to imported fuels would end and sensitivity to
price volatilities – e.g. the oil price – would diminish. Waste and biomass could be
used for combined heat and power production with higher grades of efficiency. More
and smaller plants might even result in supply stability because shortages caused by
a single powerhouse breakdown are simpler to substitute. A condition for such a 
scenario is the modernization of the grids, particular in the USA. Until 2030, the
incredible amount of $10 trillion have to be invested globally in the electricity sector,
of which more than half the money must be spent on transmission and distribution.
North America alone has to invest $1 trillion in its electricity infrastructure to
respond to maturity and growing demand. At least micro power generation – as
photovoltaic and geothermal power – bears the potential to slow down the demand
increase of households and industries by being part of the production circle. The
prospects of private energy autarky might be quite surreal but a combination of 
commercial and supportive private power production is realizable.
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These more political efforts would turn out rather useless if they are not flanked by
technological measures. The superordinate concept can be called efficiency, the
“ability to use less energy to produce the same amount of lightening, heating, trans-
portation, and other energy services.”48 Today the USA produces twice as much GDP
per unit of energy than it did 50 years ago.49 So first of all America and the
Europeans should work on further decoupling economic growth and energy con-
sumption, as well as giving support to the developing countries in doing so. Apart
from the industrial sector much is to be done regarding households and traffic. In the
USA the average domestic appliances account for one fifth of the energy costs.50
Especially electric devices in standby-mode waste about 9% of total energy
demand.51 So by making these devices more economical as a result of technological
efforts, improving insulation, using energy-saving bulbs, and such endeavors, lots of
energy could be saved or respectively used more efficiently. In addition to reduced
consumption the ability to produce energy should be improved. Some time ago
photovoltaic cells transformed 10% to 15% into electricity, today about 32% are pos-
sible.52 As two U.S. energy experts put it: “ ’Energy supply’ is determined not by
‘what is out there’ but by how good we are at finding and extracting it.” 53 But re-
search and development not only accounts for economic and ecological reasons,
lower energy demand due to higher efficiency and economical technology also con-
tributes to supply security. For example Liquefied-Natural-Gas, which still needs
some technological advancement, can open new routes of transportation and thus
further improve supply security.
5. Different strategies – common goal?
Since energy security is not solely a domestic problem and cannot be solved through
economics alone, a complementary combination of internal and external action is
required. The EU and America “share common concerns on energy efficiency, secu-
rity, market based energy policies and environment.” 54 Though at first glance their
energy policies seem to be in line with each other, but a closer look at strategic
papers reveals some pivotal differences. The “U.S. Department of Energy Strategic
Plan”locates four key elements of energy security:
– Diversity,
– Environmental Impacts,
– Infrastructures, and
– Productivity.55
The main targets are fuel substitution, energy efficiency, improving infrastructures,
widening nuclear power generation, as well as research and development in advan-
ced energy technologies. Moreover the U.S. strategy calls for a strong involvement
from the government, referring to means of regulation and stimulating investment.
Even though global cooperation is mentioned the energy plan focuses on domestic
measures, actually exploration in the Arctic Wildlife Refuge is on the agenda again.56
Nevertheless, the 2001 Cheney-Report recommends international alliances as con-
tribution to supply security through geographic diversity. Next to the Middle Eastern
region, the report promotes in particular a “North American Energy Framework” 57,
bringing together the USA and its main suppliers Canada and Mexico. But also clo-
ser cooperation with South America, sub-Saharan Africa, the Caspian region, Russia
and Asia are advised. U.S. relations with Russia and some of the Latin American sta-
tes, e.g. Venezuela, have become worse thus global energy partnerships have to be
reviewed. Irrespective of this deficit, President Bush’s “Advanced Energy Strategy”–
Baumann · Energy Security
European energy policy
Shortcomings of the
EU’s strategy 
launched in 2006 – shifted the energy spotlight back on to the technology and
domestic policy track: tax incentives and investment programs to increase efficiency,
innovation and domestic produced fuels.58
Since the 1995 “White Paper: An Energy Policy for the European Union” 59 the EU
published dozens of documents related to energy. To remedy the problem of a lack
of community competences nothing much has happened, because the Commission
always had to use a bypass over traffic-, environmental-, technology- or internal
market-regulations. Nonetheless, the EU has made substantial efforts for energy
security and against climate change. Starting with the “Green Paper”in 2000, the EU
members worked on a common strategy for a secure, affordable and sustained sup-
ply. The key characteristic for a European energy policy was the necessity to write a
strategy which 15, later 25, and now 27 sovereign states could agree on. As mention-
ed above, the intra-EU nuclear dispute is a good example for this. A revised “Green
Paper”(2006) formulates six key areas, where “a new European impetus is needed”60
and general consensus could be reached:
– Competitiveness and the internal energy market,
– Diversification of the energy mix,
– Solidarity,
– Sustainable development,
– Innovation and technology, and
– External policy.
Most obvious in comparison with the U.S. version are the lack of a functioning inter-
nal energy market and the claim for solidarity as a crisis mechanism. Due to the 
higher import dependency, the Europeans seem to be more sensitive to the energy
topics than their American counterparts. But they still failed to agree on an overall
strategy, which goes consequently beyond simple rhetoric.61 The most controversial
subjects are the national energy mixes, the relations with Russia and suspected eco-
nomics effects of lower greenhouse-gas emission and ‘green’ energy. In consequen-
ce of the aforementioned missing authority the Commission can merely set the basic
guidelines which than have to be enacted by the national legislators. If one looks i.e.
at the internal gas market the main hindrances of a European energy policy become
obvious: although the single market is approved by all member states, the
Commission reported over 30 violations in 20 states.62 This is the same problem with
generating electricity from biomass, where member states could not fulfill their self-
commitments.63 So as long as abstract and non controversial targets are on the agen-
da the EU-27 hesitates solving the problems by defining concrete measures that
should be embedded in a strategic framework.
Anyhow, below the long-term strategic level the EU member states achieved some
noteworthy results. The very recently decided binding goals for 20% CO2-reduction
and the replacement thereof by renewables are only two examples for a successful
new European energy policy.64 But on the same meeting the Heads of State and
Government could not agree  on a mandatory goal for higher energy efficiency, the
national allocation of CO2-reduction or the future of nuclear power. Apart from legal
and technical measures the “Action Plan (2007-2009): Energy Policy for Europe” 65
focuses on a common external energy policy and highlights Russia, Central Asia, the
USA, Africa and the emerging markets, namely Brazil, China and India.66 On the
analogy of the  “North American Energy Framework”Europe recognizes the relevance
of its neighborhood to create a stable trans-European energy network, including the
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member states as well as countries in the Mediterranean and Russia. Also the EU
enlargement policy will be scrutinized in the light of energy security, where Turkey
might be of geostrategic importance as a transit country. Therefore, the energy topic
is included in the EU’s external relations to build integrated energy markets and
transfer European standards into its periphery.67 A common or at least coordinated
approach towards Russia is the lynchpin of these efforts. Thus, the overdue EU ener-
gy strategy should not trail off into too many facts but rather outline shared princi-
ples and accentuate the external dimension of supply security by dealing first of all
with the Eastern neighborhood.
6. Transatlantic Energy Partnership
In Europe more attention has been paid to ecological aspects of energy over the past
decades  than in the USA, even though something like a gradual eco-shift can be
observed today.68 The recent White House initiative “Twenty in Ten”to change large
fleets to alternative fuel vehicles is only one of the examples for this development.69
But economy and security are still the prime movers. A shared policy understanding
would be essential for a transatlantic energy partnership. Converse to the overlap-
ping of superordinate targets, day-to-day energy policy of the EU and the USA dif-
fers to a remarkable degree. Washington did not sign the 2005 follow-up of the
European Energy Charta, in which it has an observer status since the adoption of the
Kyoto-Protocol in 1991, while the EU as well as its members are fully participating
in both agreements.70 So the U.S. ambitions to cooperate in the field of energy poli-
tics, which goes beyond bilateral supply contracts, are questionable.
Shared – not common – interest in regional energy-hotspots may result in conflict in
times of oil and gas shortfalls. As Michael T. Klare wrote: “… the central thesis [is]
that resource wars will become, in the years ahead, the most distinctive feature of the
global security environment … what we are seeing is the emergence of a new geo-
graphy of conflict – a global landscape in which competition over vital resources is
becoming the governing principle …”.71 So even if the transatlantic partners inten-
sify their cooperation the dawning end of fossil fuels will be a burden. When domes-
tic production of hydrocarbons is over, Europe, America, China, India, and other con-
suming countries have to find a mode to distribute the remaining resources that
satisfies all of them. But the future, oil and gas reserves will not be large enough to
satisfy the growing demand though securing national demand is supposed to domi-
nate international relations.
A transatlantic energy partnership could strengthen both the USA and the EU. First
of all, joint research programs on energy technologies – e.g. de-carbonizing – are
very promising to cause synergetic effects. As Europe and the USA, together with
Japan, are the leading regions for technology improvement energy research should
be bundled, initiating a race to the top. One possible forum is offered by the
International Energy Agency (IEA), an OECD subdivision, which brings together the
USA and 17 of 27 EU members and other countries of the industrialized world. The
IEA-research program “Science for Today’s Energy Challenges”72 is an example for a
multilateral scientific collaboration. The second field for closer cooperation is a more
coherent energy policy, which is already on the agenda: “The EU and the US are the
world’s largest energy markets. Our trade and investment relationship is the largest
in the world. We share common concerns on energy efficiency, security, market
based energy policies and the environment. As key consumers, we are in the front
row for action.”73 An EU-U.S. partnership in sustainable supply security could be the
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first step of a global energy turn; together they have a critical mass for substantial
changes. Joint action in international organizations – such as OECD, UN or WTO –
could mobilize more states to align. As climate change and energy security cannot
be solved on a national or regional basis alone, a transatlantic cooperation could at
least be a starting point for a wider, global energy regime. A third and last option is
a common crisis management. Again the IEA in form of its “oil security system”can
clarify what is meant: In the aftermath of the first Oil Crisis the OECD-countries
founded the IEA and installed oil stocks and response mechanisms to deal with
supply interruptions. As e.g. hurricane Katrina derogated oil production in the Gulf
of Mexico during September 2005 IEA-countries decided to use some of their 
stocks to stabilize the market.74 Similar collective security systems could be installed
for others fuels, i.e. natural gas, and should – under EU/US leadership – be expand-
ed onto all aspects of energy security.
7. Conclusion
A transatlantic energy partnership will not solve all problems related to energy. This
project should not aim for a common energy policy but for mutual accommodation
and harmonization, including a joint strategy towards important producers such as
Russia or Iran. Furthermore an integrated approach is needed, where supply securi-
ty is combined with the economy, ecological aspects, technology, and development.
“Bilateral engagement is important. However in many instances, working through
multilateral institutions will be the way to achieve more significant results.” 75
Globalizing energy markets and an increased trade with raw materials provide evi-
dence for this. Thus, transparency, stability and liberalization should be promoted
globally, leading to an international energy regime in the long run.
Baumann · Energy Security
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